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KENNEDY V. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAVINGS &
INVESTMENT PLAN: ANTI-ALIENATION AND ANTI-
CUTBACK RULES
Christina Payne-Tsoupros*
INTRODUCTION
In Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings &
Investment Plan, the Supreme Court held that a waiver of pension-plan
benefits through a divorce decree that was not a qualified domestic
relations order (QDRO) did not violate the anti-alienation provision of
ERISA.' The anti-alienation rule prohibits a pension-plan participant
from assigning or alienating benefits payable under the plan.2 QDROs
are exceptions to the anti-alienation rule such that an order made
pursuant to state domestic relations law allows an alternate payee to
receive benefits payable under a plan.' The Court also held that such a
(non-QDRO) waiver is effective only if consistent with the plan
documents. This decision resolved circuit splits among the courts of
appeals on these two issues. The Kennedy decision fleshed out the scope
of the anti-alienation provision of ERISA. The decision implicated the
anti-cutback rule as well. The anti-cutback rule, which was not
mentioned in the Court's decision, prohibits a plan amendment from
reducing a participant's accrued benefit (or eliminating an optional form
of benefit available under the plan). Treasury regulation section
1.411 (d)-4, Q&A (3)(a)(3) states that a waiver of protected benefits is
prohibited under the anti-cutback rule.' Kennedy allows waivers under
* Law Clerk to the Honorable John A. Gibney, Jr., U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia; J.D. 2010, William & Mary School of Law; M.Ed. 2006, University of
Houston; B.A. 2002, Cornell University. Thank you to Professor Eric Chason at William &
Mary for his encouragement and guidance in writing this article.
1. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 873 (2009).
2. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(1) (West 2010).
3. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(A).
4. Id. at 868.
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (3)(a)(3) (as amended in 2007); see also I.R.C. §
411(d)(6) (West 2010) (defining the scope of the protected benefits).
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anti-alienation, but this arguably conflicts with the Treasury regulation.
This Article explains this conflict and, as a possible means of resolving
it, recommends that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provide
guidance on the (potentially) conflicting portion of the regulation.
Part I will discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy and
explain the splits among the courts of appeals that the Kennedy decision
resolved. Part II discusses the ERISA prohibition on alienation of
pension-plan benefits under ERISA section 206(d) and the effect of the
decision in Kennedy on the anti-alienation rule. Part III discusses the
anti-cutback rule under ERISA section 204(g) and how Kennedy
implicates the anti-cutback rule. Kennedy allows a waiver of pension
benefits under anti-alienation, but Treasury regulation section 1.411 (d)-4
prohibits them under the anti-cutback rule. Part III explores whether the
regulation is valid, whether it applies only to participants or to their
beneficiaries as well, and the dilemma in which taxpayers are left as a
result of the uncertainty. The Article concludes with a recommendation
that the IRS provide guidance as to the scope and applicability of the
waiver prohibition in the regulation in light of Kennedy.
I. THE KENNEDY DECISION
Prior to Kennedy, there was a split among the courts of appeals as
to whether a divorced spouse could waive pension benefits through a
divorce decree that was not a QDRO.6 Further, there was a split among
the courts of appeals as to "whether a beneficiary's federal common law
waiver of plan benefits [was] effective where that waiver [was]
inconsistent with plan documents."'
A. The Court's Decision in Kennedy
William Kennedy was a DuPont employee and participant in
DuPont's savings and investment plan (SIP), a pension plan governed by
ERISA. William designated his wife, Liv, as the sole beneficiary of his
retirement plan in 1974.9 Under the terms of the SIP, a participant had
the power "both to 'designate any beneficiary or beneficiaries . .. to
receive all or part' of the funds upon his death, and to 'replace or revoke
6. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 870.
7. Id
8. Id. at 868.
9. Id. at 869.
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such designation."" 0 William and Liv divorced twenty years later."
According to the divorce decree, Liv disclaimed all of her "right, title,
interest, and claim ... related to any . .. retirement plan, pension plan,
or like benefit program existing by reason of [William's] past or present
or future employment."12 The divorce decree was not a QDRO because
it did not create or recognize the rights of an alternate payee or assign
the alternate payee the right to receive a portion of the benefits of the
plan; it simply eliminated Liv's rights. 13 William "retired from DuPont
in 1998 and died in 2001."l4 William never removed nor replaced Liv as
his SIP beneficiary." William had not named a contingent beneficiary if
Liv disclaimed her interest.16 Upon William's death, William and Liv's
17daughter, Kari Kennedy, was named the executor of William's estate.
Kari, as executor, requested DuPont to distribute the funds to the
estate. Kari claimed that Liv had waived her benefits in the divorce
decree. DuPont denied Kari's request on behalf of the estate, and
following the beneficiary designation, paid the balance (which amounted
to $400,000) to Liv. 20
Kari sued to recover the benefits, claiming that Liv waived her
benefits in the divorce decree, invalidating the beneficiary designation.2 1
She claimed that DuPont incorrectly distributed the benefits.2 2 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary
10. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 868 (omission in original).
11. Id. at 869.
12. Id. at 869 (second omission in original) (alteration in original). Disclaimers are
based on section 2518 of the Internal Revenue Code. When someone disclaims a benefit, it is
as if she never received that interest. See I.R.C. § 2518(a) (West 2010).
13. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 873.
14. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 428 (5th Cir.
2007), aff'd, 555 U.S. 285 (2009).
15. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 869. William did designate his daughter, Kari Kennedy, as
the new beneficiary for DuPont's Pension and Retirement Plan, another plan governed by
ERISA, which William had with DuPont. Id. The Pension and Retirement Plan was not at
issue in the Kennedy case. See id Under the Supreme Court's decision in Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, the divorce itself could not defeat Liv's claims to benefits. See
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001); see also Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 877 ("[I]n Egelhoff we
held that ERISA preempted a state law providing that the designation of a spouse as the
beneficiary of a nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon divorce.").
16. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 869.
17. Id.
18. Id
19. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 428 (5th Cir.
2007), aff'd, 555 U.S. 285 (2009).
20. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 869.
2 1. Id
22. Id.
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judgment for the estate, finding that the "named ERISA beneficiary may
waive his or her entitlement to the proceeds of an ERISA
plan .. . provided that the waiver is explicit, voluntary, and made in
good faith."23 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the
District Court's judgment, holding that Liv's waiver was an
impermissible assignment or alienation of benefits.24 The Fifth Circuit
stated that a QDRO is the only means by which a participant or
beneficiary can waive pension benefits. 25
The Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari is significant
because it resolved the issue of whether a QDRO is the only valid means
a divorcing spouse has to waive the right to an ex-spouse's pension
benefit. 2 6 In fact, the Court held that a QDRO cannot be used to waive
these rights.27 The Court explained that, by definition, Liv's waiver
could not be a QDRO because a QDRO requires the designation of an
alternate payee "to receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with
respect to a participant under a plan." 28 A waiver simply disclaims the
benefits; it does not provide for an alternate payee.2 9 The Fifth Circuit
was therefore incorrect in holding that a QDRO was the proper way to
effectuate the waiver.30 Had Liv's waiver satisfied the requirements of a
QDRO, the order still would not have allowed for a waiver of benefits.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth's Circuit's decision, but on
23. Kennedy v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 1:01-CV-904, 2005 WL 6059238,
at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2005) (quoting Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 874 (5th Cir.
2000)), vacated in part sub nom. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 497
F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 555 U.S. 285 (2009).
24. Kennedy, 497 F.3d at 433.
25. Id. at 431 ("ERISA provides a specific mechanism-the QRDO-for addressing the
elimination of a spouse's interest in plan benefits, but that mechanism is not invoked .... ).
26. Jayne Zanglein & Janet Ford, Deji) Vu All Over Again: Will the Supreme Court's
ERISA Decisions Prompt the Fifth Circuit to Revise Its Standards?, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REv.
897, 946 (2009); see also David A. Furlow & Kevin R. Pennell, An ERISA Waiver/Federalism
Case in the United States Supreme Court, October 7, 2008, in ERISA LITIGATION 107, 125
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 19526, 2008), available at
Westlaw 788 PLI/Lit 107 ("Since fifty-one percent (5 1%) of workers have pension plans, an
appeal about pension payments in a divorce context could have a major impact on
approximately 300,000 to 400,000 divorcing workers per year, and on their families, friends,
and beneficiaries as well.").
27. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 873 (2009).
28. Id. at 873 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2010)); see also infra notes
103-07 and accompanying text (setting forth the QDRO requirements).
29. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 873.
3 0. Id.
31. Id. at 875.
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different grounds.3 2 The Supreme Court held that a waiver of pension-
plan benefits through a divorce decree is not an assignment or alienation
and thus does not violate ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The
Court also held that in instances in which a beneficiary's waiver of plan
documents is inconsistent with the plan documents, the plan documents
control.34 DuPont was therefore correct in distributing the funds to Liv
because under the terms of William's plan, she was the beneficiary.3 s
B. The Effect of Kennedy
Kennedy resolved the split among the circuit courts as to whether
a divorced spouse could waive pension benefits through a divorce
decree that was not a QDRO. 6 The lower federal courts had danced
around this issue of whether such a waiver implicated (and thus
potentially violated) the anti-alienation rule.37 Prior to Kennedy, there
was a rough dividing line in the case law between courts that held a
waiver to be outside the scope of the anti-alienation rule and courts that
held a waiver subject to the anti-alienation rule, finding that
"beneficiaries may not waive their rights to a plan's benefits because the
waiver is a prohibited assignment."3 8
32. Id. at 870.
33. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 873 ("Liv did not attempt to direct her interest in the SIP
benefits . . . and accordingly we think that the better view is that her waiver did not constitute
an assignment or alienation rendered void under the terms of § 1056(d)(1)").
34. Id. at 875 ("[Tlhe plan administrator did its statutory ERISA duty by paying the
benefits to Liv in conformity with the plan documents.").
35. Id The Supreme Court noted that it would have been easy for William to change
his beneficiary designation, as the plan provided a way to do so, but William did not take this
option. Id. at 877. The plan provided forms where William would have been able to change
his beneficiary designation. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 868.
36. See id. at 870.
37. Examples of cases in which lower courts have held that a federal common law
waiver of benefits in a divorce decree does not run afoul of the anti-cutback provision include:
Estate of Altobelli v. International Business Machines Corp., 77 F.3d 78 (4th Cir. 1996),
abrogated by Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. 865, and Fox Valley & Vicinity Construction Workers
Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. 865.
McGowan v. NJR Services Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005), abrogated by Kennedy, 129 S.
Ct. 865, is an example of a case in which a lower court held that the anti-alienation rule
prohibits a federal common law waiver of benefits. The Supreme Court listed these decisions
in discussing the circuit split. See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 870 n.4.
38. Michael P. Barry, Kennedy, ERISA Beneficiary Designations, and the Plan
Documents Rule, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Dec. 17, 2009, at 2; see also Eric D. Chason,
Settlements and Waivers Affecting Pension Benefits Under ERISA, BENEFITS L.J., Winter
2001, at 61, 64-65 (distinguishing courts that consider waivers valid "if they are 'knowing
1077201l]
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For example, in Estate of Altobelli v. International Business
Machines Corp., the decedent participant's estate sought a declaratory
judgment that the ex-spouse had waived her interest in the decedent's
pension and life insurance proceeds in the divorce decree.3 9 The Fourth
Circuit held that the anti-alienation rule does not apply to waivers. 4 0 The
Fourth Circuit noted the purpose of the anti-alienation rule is "to
safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents . . )"
and stated, "[t]o bar a waiver in favor of the pensioner himself would not
advance that purpose." 4 1 Thus, the waiver was valid and the former
spouse was not entitled to the benefit. 42
By contrast, other courts held that a waiver is subject to the anti-
alienation rule, and considered it invalid on this basis. For example, in
McGowan v. NJR Service Corp., the participant had designated his
former wife as the beneficiary of his retirement benefits.4 3 The
participant then sought a declaratory judgment that his former wife's
waiver was valid and therefore his benefits would pass to his current
wife." The Third Circuit stated that what the participant sought was "to
use the concept of waiver in order to effectuate what is the functional
equivalent of an assignment of benefits from his former wife to his
current wife."45 Recognizing that the waiver would effectuate an
"indirect arrangement" to the current wife, which would "fit within the
and voluntary,"' and courts that only consider waivers "valid if they do not result in the
alienation of 'established' pension rights").
39. Estate ofAltobelli, 77 F.3d at 80; see also Laniok v. Advisory Comm. of Brainerd
Mfg. Co. Pension Plan, 935 F.2d 1360, 1367-68 (2d Cir. 1990) (setting forth a list of factors
to be used in determining whether a waiver or settlement meets the "knowing and voluntary"
standard that were used in subsequent anti-alienation cases).
40. Estate ofAltobelli, 77 F.3d at 81.
41. Id at 81 (omission in original) (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'1
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3613(a)
(West 2010)).
42. Id. at 82.
43. McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 243 (3d Cir. 2005), abrogated by
Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009); see also Chason,
supra note 38, at 67-68 (discussing Licciardi v. Kropp Forge Div. Employees' Ret. Plan, 990
F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1993) and Lynn v. CSX Transp., Inc., 84 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 1996) as
examples of cases that "suggest[] distinctions between permissibly settling pension disputes
and impermissibly alienating pension benefits").
44. McGowan, 423 F.3d at 244.
45. Id. at 249. Foreshadowing the Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy, the Third
Circuit stated that a "'waiver' is not the same thing as assignment or alienation. Assignment
or alienation involves an affirmative transfer of benefits to another person, whereas waiver
usually involves only a refusal of benefits on the part of the individual slated to receive them."
Id. at 248.
1078 [Vol. 29:1073
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definition of 'assignment or alienation,"' the Third Circuit held that the
waiver was invalid under the anti-alienation rule.46
In addition, Kennedy resolved the split among the circuits as to
whether a federal common law waiver is effective if the waiver is
inconsistent with the plan documents.4 7 Prior to Kennedy, a split existed
between courts following the "plan documents" approach (or the
"statutory approach") and the courts following the "federal common law
waiver" approach.4 8 Under the plan documents approach, "ERISA does
not allow a named beneficiary to waive rights to plan benefits through a
divorce decree or other contract." 4 9  Under this approach, the plan
administrator should ignore the waiver if it conflicts with the beneficiary
designation filed with the plan documents.50 The rationale supporting
the adoption of the plan documents rule is that it is simple and
administrable.5 1  The plan administrators and beneficiaries immediately
learn of their rights and abilities. 52  "The plan documents rule saves
46. Id. at 249. The Third Circuit also stated that recognizing the waiver in these
circumstances would undermine the anti-alienation rule. McGowan, 423 F.3d at 249.
47. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 870
(2009). "In effect, the Supreme Court in Kennedy sided with those courts which previously
took a 'plan documents' approach, rather than a 'federal common law approach,' i.e., looking
at the surrounding circumstances, including language waiving benefits in divorce decrees."
Staelens ex rel. Estate of Staelens v. Staelens, 677 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506 (D. Mass. 2010). The
court in Staelens, however, noted that Kennedy is distinguishable from other plan documents
decisions because Kennedy is not based on a failure to file a QDRO. Id; see also infra notes
103-07 and accompanying text (explaining requirements for a court order to qualify as a
QDRO).
48. Furlow & Pennell, supra note 26, at 122; Patricia L. Vannoy, Note, R.I.P.: The
Federal Common Law Waiver Approach to Retirement Plan Death Benefits Finally Rests in
Peace After Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 497 F.3d
426 (5th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009), 88 NEB. L. REv. 204, 205-06 (2009).
49. Vannoy, supra note 48, at 211.
50. Furlow & Pennell, supra note 26, at 122. Furlow and Pennell note that the plan
documents approach was the minority approach prior to Kennedy. Id.; accord Barry, supra
note 38, at 3.
51. Barry, supra note 38, at 7 ("The plan documents rule is indeed the simplest and
most uniform way to adjudicate matters when a conflict exists between a domestic relations
order and an ERISA plan's beneficiary designation form(s)."). Barry notes that during oral
arguments in Kennedy, Chief Justice John Roberts stressed that the Supreme Court sought "to
develop a rule for all cases and . . . the easiest, most administrable rule is to say whoever's
name appears there [on the beneficiary form] gets the money." Id. (alteration in original)
(omission in original) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for
DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009) (No. 07-636)); see also Vannoy, supra note
48, at 211 (stating that courts that adhere to the plan documents approach look to policies
underlying ERISA in support of "holdings [that] afford simple, uniform administration and
allow parties to avoid the expense of litigation because they can be certain of their rights at
all times").
52. Barry, supra note 38, at 7. ("Strict adherence to the plan documents rule allows plan
10792011]
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money," 53 because if parties involved can easily discern the correct
beneficiary, there is less chance of costly and time-consuming
litigation. 4 The plan administrator will not need to interpret vague or
unclear waiver language.s The plan administrator will not have to
master the laws of fifty states.56 Finally, the plan documents rule is
simple and administrable because it helps a plan administrator avoid
double liability.57
In addition, according to the language in fiduciary provisions, "a
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... in accordance with
the documents and instruments governing the plan... ". Under a
strictly textual reading or argument, the statute itself compels an
interpretation consistent with the plan documents.
Boggs v. Boggs59 and Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,o cited in Kennedy,
support this interpretation.6 1 In Egelhoff, David Egelhoff worked at the
Boeing Company.6 2 David designated his wife, Donna Egelhoff, as the
administrators, beneficiaries, participants, and employees to immediately 'learn their rights
and obligations at any time."' (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73,
83 (1995))).
53. Id.
54. Id. In addition, such litigation and other administrative expenses "could
'discourage' employers from continuing to offer benefit plans, or from offering such plans in
the first place." Id. (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)); see also Jo-el J.
Meyer, Beneficiary Designations: High Court Adopts 'Plan Documents' Rule for Resolving
ERISA Beneficiary Disputes, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Jan. 27, 2009, at 1 ("[A] ruling to
the contrary that would have required administrators to look beyond plan documents would
have created the burdens of delay and expense for plan administrators.").
55. Barry, supra note 38, at 7. Barry notes that "[t]o hold otherwise would complicate
plan administration because 'waiver provisions are often sweeping in their terms, leaving their
precise effect on plan benefits unclear."' Id. (quoting Estate of Altobelli v. Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 77. F.3d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1996) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting), abrogated by Kennedy v.
Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009)).
56. Id. (citing Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 142 (2001)).
57. Id. at 7-8 (providing an example in which double liability could arise).
58. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (West 2010) (emphasis added); see also Barry, supra
note 38, at 5 (citing Egelhoff 532 U.S. at 151 n.4) ("ERISA's use of the word 'shall' in this
section constitutes a 'command' which plan fiduciaries are obligated to follow.");
59. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
60. Egelhoff 532 U.S. 141.
61. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 876-77
(2009); see, e.g., Barry, supra note 38, at 7 (stating that ERISA requires "plans be
administered, and benefits paid, in accordance with plan documents" (quoting Egelhoff, 532
U.S. at 159)). "ERISA's scheme is 'built around reliance on the face of written plan
documents."' Barry, supra note 38, at 5 (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,
514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995)).
62. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 144.
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beneficiary under his life insurance and pension plans, both of which
were governed by ERISA.63 David and Donna divorced; shortly
thereafter, David died."" Donna remained the listed beneficiary under
65both plans and Boeing paid her the $46,000 in life insurance proceeds.
David's children from a previous marriage were his heirs under a
Washington state divorce revocation statute. The children sued Donna
to recover the life insurance proceeds. Concluding that the
Washington law provided a different means of governing the distribution
of benefits, the Supreme Court held that held that the law affects a
"central matter of plan administration."68
In Boggs, Isaac Boggs retired from South Central Bell and received
various benefits including "a lump sum distribution ... which he rolled
over into an Individual Retirement Account," which was worth
approximately $180,000 when he died in 1989.69 Isaac's second wife,
Sandra, claimed she was entitled to the benefits because she was the
plan's designated beneficiary.70 Isaac's sons from his prior marriage to
Dorothy (who predeceased Isaac) claimed they were entitled to the
proceeds under Louisiana community property law.7' The Court held
that the Louisiana law directly "clashed" with the objectives of ERISA
such that allowing the sons' claim to stand would undermine the
objective of "ensur[ing] a stream of income to surviving spouses." 7 2
In Kennedy, the Court relied on these cases, which primarily
focused on preemption issues. Part of the rationale for these decisions
was the importance of following what was specified in the plan
documents to avoid the problems of following varying state laws.74 For
example, in Egelhoff the Court noted that the (preempted) state law "has
a prohibited connection with ERISA plans because it interferes with
63. Id
64. Id
65. Id.
66. Egelhoff 532 U.S. at 144. Under the state law, a divorce revokes the former
spouse's interest in any non-probate assets, which includes a life insurance plan. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 148. The Court also stressed concerns of plan uniformity. Egelhoff 532 U.S.
at 148.
69. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 836 (1997).
70. Id. at 837.
71. Id. at 836.
72. Id. at 843.
73. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 876 (2009).
In both cases, the Court held that ERISA preempted state law. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 143;
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 836.
74. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148-49; Boggs, 520 U.S. at 840.
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nationally uniform plan administration."75  In Boggs, in rejecting the
respondent's argument that the Court look beyond the ERISA section
3(8) definition of beneficiary to include a new class of people for whom
plan assets are held or managed, the Court stated that a decision in the
respondent's favor would lead to a "complex set of requirements varying
from State to State."76
The written instrument rule requires that every plan "shall be
established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument."7 7  The
written instrument must "specify the basis on which payments are made
to and from the plan."78 The written instrument rule, it can be argued,
gives weight to the plan documents approach. For example, in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v. Pressley, the Sixth Circuit cited
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D), which requires "a plan administrator [to]
discharge his duties 'in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan.. . ."'79 Another example of a case utilizing the plan
documents rule is McMillan v. Parrott.80 In McMillan, the Sixth Circuit
held that plan documents that named the former spouse as the
beneficiary controlled, even though the ex-spouse had waived the
benefits in the divorce decree.81 The Sixth Circuit stated this result
conformed to congressional intent "that ERISA plans be uniform in their
interpretation and simple in their application. 82
Justice Souter, writing for the Court in Kennedy, adopted this
approach:
The plan administrator is obliged to act "in accordance with the documents
and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments
are consistent with the provisions of [Title 1] and [Title IV] of [ERISA],"
and the Act provides no exemption from this duty when it comes time to
pay benefits.
75. Egelhoff 532 U.S. at 148. The Court went on to note the burden on plan
administrators of following numerous state statutes. Id at 148-49.
76. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 850-51.
77. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a)(1) (West 2010).
78. Id. § 1102(b)(4).
79. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 130 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting 29
U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (West 2010)).
80. McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1990), reh 'g granted, 922 F.2d 841 (6th
Cir. 1990).
81. Id. at 311-12.
82. Id. at 312 (citing H. REP. No. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4650).
83. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 875 (2009)
1082 [Vol. 29:1073
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The Court continued: "[B]y giving a plan participant a clear set of
instructions for making his own instructions clear, ERISA forecloses any
justification for enquiries into nice expressions of intent, in favor of the
virtues of adhering to an uncomplicated rule . ... "84 The Court referred
to itself as "holding the line" in adhering to the bright line rule of
following the plan documents, citing both Boggs and Egelhoff as
supporting precedent.s
Under the alternative approach, the federal common law approach,
courts looked at surrounding circumstances in a particular case,
including any language in a divorce decree purporting to waive
benefits.86 An example of a case utilizing the federal common law
approach is Fox Valley & Vicinity Construction Workers Pension Fund
v. Brown.8 7 In Fox Valley, although the ex-spouse was still designated
as the beneficiary in the plan documents, the Seventh Circuit held that
the waiver of benefits in the divorce decree was valid.
Kennedy jettisoned the distinction among the lower courts as
to whether a common-law waiver ran afoul of the anti-alienation
rule, essentially giving a green light to waivers. 89 Kennedy also sided
with the courts that held that the plan documents control if there
are inconsistencies between the plan documents and a common-
law waiver.9 0
II. ANTI-ALIENATION AFTER KENNEDY
A. The Anti-Alienation Rule Defined
Under section 206(d), ERISA requires that "[e]ach pension plan
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned
(alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 1 104(a)(1)(D) (West 2010)).
84. Id. at 876.
85. Id; see also Barry, supra note 38, at 6 ("By holding the line here, Justice
Souter probably felt that under the facts of Kennedy, the Court could easily have looked at this
case with an equitable eye and awarded the SIP funds to the estate pursuant to federal
common law.").
86. Leon 1. Finkel & Hailee R. Bloom, Changing Pension Beneficiaries After Divorce:
It's More Important After Kennedy, 97 ILL. B.J. 462, 462 (2009) (calling the federal common
law approach the majority view before Kennedy).
87. Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th
Cir. 1990), abrogated by Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. 865.
88. Id. at 281.
89. See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 874-75.
90. See id.
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or alienated." 91  The anti-alienation rule applies to both voluntary
assignments and involuntary alienations. 92 The anti-alienation provision
stems from trust law.93 Under trust law, spendthrift clauses prohibit a
trust beneficiary from "alienating the corpus of the trust." 94 Whereas the
spendthrift clause is optional in trust law,95 the anti-alienation provision
is required for pension plans under ERISA.96  Under ERISA's broad
preemption power, state laws that seek to alter distribution mechanisms
of the plan are preempted 9 7 such that anti-alienation coupled with
preemption "provides qualified plan participants with an almost
impenetrable shield against third party creditors."9 8
The purpose of the anti-alienation provision is protective; it
prevents participants from "spending retirement savings before
retirement." 99 The anti-alienation rule reflects Congress's policy choice
to safeguard a stream of income for participants (as well as their
dependents who usually are not at fault), even if that decision prevents
others from securing relief for wrongs done to them. 00
There are four exceptions to the anti-alienation rule. 01  The
exception that Kennedy brings to the forefront is the exception for a
91. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(1) (West 2010).
92. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 269 (4th ed.
2006) (citing Morlan v. Universal Guar. Life Ins. Co., 298 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2002)).
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1051(1) (West 2010) (detailing the mandatory provisions and to
which plans they apply); see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 269 ("ERISA's anti-
alienation rule, by contrast [to the optional spendthrift clause of a trust], is a mandatory term
that the statute requires every pension trust to contain."). Anti-alienation does not apply to
welfare benefits. COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW:
POLICY AND PRACTICE 228 (2d ed. 2007) (citing ERISA § 201(1), which states that the
provisions of Part 2 do not apply to employee welfare benefit plans); see also Chason, supra
note 38, at 62-63 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S.
825 (1988)).
97. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 2010).
98. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 226.
99. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 269 ("It would scarcely make sense to stop the
participant from drawing down his or her pension account for current consumption if the
participant's creditor could present the bills arising from the participant's consumption spree
to the pension plan by way of assignment or in the form of a judgment debt.").
100. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 852 (1997) (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C.A. §
3613(a) (West 2010)).
101. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 228.
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QDRO. 10 2  According to ERISA section 206(d)(3), the anti-alienation
rule "shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to
any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic
relations order, except that [the anti-alienation rule] shall not apply if the
order is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order."' 0 3
Congress added the QDRO exception as part of the Retirement Equity
Act of 198414 to make a participant's retirement benefits "available to
support the family in the context of a divorce or separation."o10
A QDRO is a domestic relations order that "creates or recognizes
the existence of an alternate payee's rights to, or assigns to an alternate
payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with
respect to a participant under a plan." 10 6  An "alternate payee" is a
dependent of the participant, such as a spouse, former spouse, or child.107
B. The Effect of Kennedy on Anti-Alienation
Despite some lower court decisions to the contrary,108 as a result of
102. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865,
868 (2009).
103. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (West 2010). The other statutory exceptions to the
anti-alienation rule are for a loan by the plan made to the participant from assets held in the
participant's account, a voluntary and revocable assignment of not more than ten percent of
any benefit payment made to the participant, made by a participant to a third party, id. §
1056(d)(2), and if the fiduciary breached a fiduciary duty causing losses to the plan, then a
state or federal court order, judgment, consent decree, or settlement agreement attaching the
plan benefits if that fiduciary is also a participant. Id. § 1056(d)(4)(A).
104. See Zanglein & Ford, supra note 26, at 947 n.559; see also 1 MICHAEL J. CANAN,
QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 7:27 (2010) ("It is now clear that plan administrators may
comply with a state court order requiring benefit payments to former spouses and other
'alternate payees' . . . but only if the order meets the statutory criteria for a 'qualified domestic
relations order' (QDRO).").
105. Sharon Reece, The Times Are "A-Changing" Towards a Living Statute
Jurisprudence in ERISA, 40 U. MEM. L. REv. 55, 101 (2009); see also LANGBEIN ET AL.,
supra note 92, at 272 ("The guiding purpose of the 1984 legislation was to enhance the
retirement income security of the homemaker, characteristically the wife, in traditional
support marriages, in which only the employed spouse has significant earnings opportunities
outside the home.").
106. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (West 2010). To qualify as a QDRO, the order
must "relate[] to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights
to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant." Id. §
1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I). To meet the requirements of a QDRO, the order must meet certain
specifications of ERISA section 206(d)(3)(C). See id. § 1056(d)(3)(C). A QDRO may not
require more than is allowed by the plan, either in the context of increased benefits or by
providing options not otherwise available under the plan. See id § 1056(d)(3)(D).
107. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(K) (West 2010).
108. See, for example, Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and
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Kennedy, QDROs cannot serve as mere waivers.109 This is because of
the alternate payee requirement of the QDRO-a QDRO requires an
alternate payee to be designated." 0 A QDRO thus cannot be used to
disclaim benefits.
Kennedy narrows the scope of the anti-alienation rule such that
waivers do not implicate (and therefore do not risk running afoul of) the
anti-alienation rule."' Kennedy did not, however, actually invalidate the
common-law waivers.1 12 Some argue that other avenues for enforcing
the waiver, including directly suing the party granting the waiver may
still be available.'1 3  This does not appear possible under Boggs,
however, because ERISA will preempt the claim."14
Additionally, the Court in Kennedy specifically noted that the
decision "[does] not address a situation in which the plan documents
provide no means for a beneficiary to renounce an interest in
benefits."' 15 William's SIP had a mechanism whereby a beneficiary
could disclaim benefits; Liv did not follow it." 6  Some scholars have
argued that this footnote in the Court's opinion may allow lower federal
courts to distinguish those situations where the plan does not provide a
procedure for disclaiming benefits from Kennedy and not adhere to the
plan documents rule." 7 This was indeed the result in a 2009 decision in
Matschiner v. Lewis in the District of Nebraska."t8  The district court
held that because the plan documents did not contain a disclaimer or
waiver provision, Kennedy did not apply.119
Investment Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 431 (5th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009), where the
Fifth Circuit stated that the QDRO is the mechanism by which a beneficiary would disclaim
her interest.
109. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 873 (2009).
110. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (West 2010); see also supra notes 106-07
and accompanying text.
111. See Supreme Court Rules That Waiver of Benefits in Divorce Decree Does Not
Override Beneficiary Designation, 37 TAx MGM'T. COMPENSATION PLAN. J. 99, 99 (2009)
(noting that Kennedy does not invalidate waivers, but that, in order to give effect to a waiver,
"a plan will need to contain language to this effect"); supra note 37 and accompanying text.
112. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 873 (2009).
113. See, e.g., RIA Pension & Benefits Library, RIA Benefits Analysis § 138,817.6,
available at Westlaw 2OXX WL 1166485.
114. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
115. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 877 n.13.
116. Id. at 877.
117. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 38, at 9.
118. Matschiner v. Lewis, No. 8:07CV435, 2009 WL 387737, at *1 (D. Neb. Feb. 13,
2009), rev'd, 622 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2010).
119. Id. ("Although the factual circumstances of Kennedy and the present case under
consideration are quite similar, an important distinction between the two exists: in contrast to
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case,
stating that the Supreme Court "did not intend to exempt from the
plan documents rule all welfare benefit plans that do not contain an
express waiver-of-benefits provision."l 2 0  The Eighth Circuit further
noted, "[w]e suspect that footnote 13 was simply a reminder that
'common sense and common law' may apply to prevent the plan
documents rule combined with ERISA's anti-alienation provision from
precluding a pension benefit plan beneficiary from disclaiming an
unwanted interest."l21
The Fourth Circuit reached the same result on a case with similar
facts. In Boyd v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the life insurance
plan at issue did not set forth a procedure for disclaiming benefits.122
The Fourth Circuit discussed Matschiner and agreed with the Eighth
Circuit that footnote 13 "only addresses situations where a plan
'preclud[es] a pension benefit plan beneficiary from disclaiming an
unwanted interest."'l
23
To some extent, the full scope of the anti-alienation rule after
Kennedy has yet to be fleshed out. The view among the lower courts at
this point appears to be that Kennedy endorsed a sweeping view of the
plan documents rule.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ANTI-CUTBACK RULE IN LIGHT
OF KENNEDY
A. The Anti-Cutback Rule Defined
Kennedy provides the scope of the anti-alienation rule,12 4 but
another ERISA provision is also potentially implicated. Under ERISA
section 204(g), the anti-cutback rule, an amendment to a qualified plan
cannot reduce a participant's accrued benefit under the plan or eliminate
an optional form of benefit under the plan.125 The purpose of the anti-
the plan at issue in Kennedy, the Hartford Plan at issue here does not provide a method or
provision by which a beneficiary can disclaim his or her interest in the benefits. . . . This
distinction is important because it removes this action from the reaches of the Kennedy
holding." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
120. Matschiner v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 622 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2010).
121. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865,
872 (2009).
122. Boyd v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 138, 139 (4th Cir. 2011).
123. Id. at 144 (quoting Matschiner, 622 F.3d at 888) (alteration in original).
124. See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 870-73.
125. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(g)(l)-(2) (West 2010). The anti-cutback rule applies only to
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cutback rule is to protect the participant's benefits that have already
accrued under the plan. 12 6  The anti-cutback rule prevents the plan's
sponsor from using plan amendments to retroactively repeal or reduce a
participant's already accrued benefits. 12 7 The anti-cutback rule is critical
to the integrity of the vesting rules for qualified plans; otherwise vesting
would be meaningless.12 8 If a plan amendment runs afoul of the anti-
cutback rule, ERISA section 2 04 (g) authorizes the plan's participants to
bring a private civil action challenging the amendment.12 9
In the context of a defined benefit plan, the anti-cutback rule
protects the age sixty-five annuity.3 o The accrued benefit is "the
individual's accrued benefit determined under the plan ... expressed in
the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age."' 3'
ERISA sets forth specific accrual methods for defined benefit plans.13 2
These methods determine the benefit at age sixty-five, which is
generally considered the normal age of retirement.133  The purpose of
these benefit accrual methods is to prevent the employer from
"backloading benefits under a defined benefit plan." 34 By contrast, with
pension plans. See id. § 105 1(1) (stating that the provisions of the participation and vesting
sections of ERISA do not apply to welfare plans). By contrast, a plan sponsor has essentially
free reign with respect to unilaterally amending or terminating welfare plans, subject to any
contractual restrictions the plan agreed to with the participants. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995); McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1991); see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 169-70.
126. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 132.
127. Id. For example, in Shaw v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers Pension Plan, the plaintiff's pension plan included cost of living adjustments. Shaw
v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653, 654 (C.D.
Cal. 1983), af'd, 750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). The defendant began to phase out of the cost
of living adjustments on the advice of plan actuaries, who stated that the plan would "suffer
serious financial instability" if such actions were not taken. Id. The court found that the cost
of living adjustment constituted an accrued benefit under ERISA section 3(23), and, therefore,
could not be taken away under ERISA section 204(g). Id. at 657.
128. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 132; see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 169
("Without § 204(g), a retroactive plan amendment could subvert the plan's vesting regime.").
129. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 132; see also I.R.C. § 41 l(d)(6) (West 2010). Benefits
protected by the anti-cutback rule are often called "411 (d)(6) benefits." See LANGBEIN ET
AL., supra note 92, at 172; MEDILL, supra note 96, at 132.
130. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 135.
131. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(23)(A) (West 2010).
132. There are three permissible methods for calculating the accrued benefit for a defined
contribution plan: the 133-1/3% method, the fractional method, and the 3% method. See
I.R.C. § 411 (b)(1) (West 2010).
133. See LANGBEINETAL.,supra note 92, at 157.
134. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 135. Before ERISA was enacted, "it was not
uncommon" for employers to set up the defined benefit plan so that the participant would not
accrue a significant portion of the benefits until just before retirement. Id. This way, if the
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a defined contribution plan, the anti-cutback rule protects the
participant's account balance-the vested and nonvested balance of the
individual account under the plan.13 5
The anti-cutback rule also prevents an employer from eliminating
optional forms of benefit available to participants. 136 The classic
example of the optional form of benefit is the option to take a lump sum
distribution.137 The anti-cutback rule, however, does not apply to plan
features that are ancillary benefits or administrative features of the plan,
such as accident or life insurance benefits, or the valuation dates for
account balances.138  The anti-cutback rule applies to those benefits
already accrued by the participant;'3 9 it does not prohibit an employer
from amending the plan prospectively in a way that would reduce the
participant's future benefit accrual or to eliminate an optional form of
benefit regarding benefits that have not yet accrued under the plan. 140
B. How Kennedy Implicates the Anti-Cutback Rule
Kennedy does not speak to plan amendments or the anti-cutback
rule.141 Although the Supreme Court held that a waiver does not violate
the anti-alienation rule, it is possible that a waiver may run afoul of the
anti-cutback rule.14 2 The IRS has determined that the anti-cutback rule
applies to waivers.143 According to Treasury regulation section
1.411 (d)-4, Q&A (3), "a participant may not elect to waive section
411(d)(6) protected benefits," subject to an exception for elective
transfers or benefits between defined contribution plans.144 Thus,
participant terminated employment prior to retirement, "such a backloaded defined benefit
plan provided only nominal benefits to the participant." Id.
135. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(23)(B) (West 2010) (stating that the accrued benefit is "the
balance of the individual's account").
136. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(g)(2)(B) (West 2010).
137. According to the Treasury Department regulations, an optional form is "a
distribution alternative (including the normal form of benefit) that is available under the plan
with respect to an accrued benefit or a distribution alternative with respect to a retirement-type
benefit." Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-3(g)(6)(ii) (as amended in 2007).
138. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (1)(d) (as amended in 2007).
139. BARRY KOZAK, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 137 (2010).
140. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 138; see also KOZAK supra note 139, at 137. The
employer must provide the participant with advance written notice under ERISA section
204(h) of such a plan amendment. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(h) (West 2010).
141. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009).
142. Id. at 873.
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (3)(a)(3) (as amended in 2007).
144. Id.; see also Chason, supra note 38, at 76 n.6 ("Upon termination of a plan, the
2011] 1089
0QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW
according to the IRS, a participant may not waive a benefit protected by
the anti-cutback rule. 14 5 Liv was a beneficiary, not a participant in the
plan, so the Kennedy decision did not contradict the precise terms of the
regulation.14 6  A reading of the regulation, however, prompts the
question of whether the regulation, when properly interpreted, does in
fact apply only to participants and not to their beneficiaries as well.
1. Whether Regulation Section 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (3) is Valid
Kennedy also raises the issue of whether the regulation is actually
valid. Kennedy brings forth a potential conflict: If the regulation
includes both participants and beneficiaries, then according to the IRS,
Liv's waiver in Kennedy was impermissible-if her benefit is protected
under the anti-cutback rule. It seems that either the IRS or the Supreme
Court is in error, as these two views do not appear to be reconcilable. A
preliminary question is whether the IRS has exceeded its regulatory
authority in applying the anti-cutback rules to waivers.
The IRS's authority to promulgate Treasury regulation section
1.411 (d)-4 comes from section 1502 of the Internal Revenue Code,
according to the text of the regulation. 147 It is not unlikely that the IRS
thinks Treasury regulation section 1.411 (d)-4 is invalid to the extent that
it brings waivers under the scope of the anti-cutback rule. 148 A waiver is
not the same thing as an amendment. Neither of these terms is defined
in ERISA. The terms are used in the case law according to their plain
meaning definitions.149 A waiver is a legal instrument evincing "the act
accumulated funding deficiency cannot be deemed corrected by having plan participants
'waive' their accrued benefits." (quoting IRM 7.7.2.2.4 (Apr. 20, 1999)).
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (d)-4, Q&A (3)(a)(3) (as amended in 2007).
146. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 869.
147. I.R.C. § 1502 (West 2010); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4 (as amended in
2007); see also infra note 195 (discussing the sources of authority for promulgating
Treasury regulations).
148. As Chason notes:
[T]his regulation probably is invalid. It is black-letter law that the anticutback rule
applies only to plan amendments .... [T]he word amendment is used as a word of
limitation . . . . Congress did not state that any change would trigger [the
anticutback rule]; it stated that any change by amendment would do so. ... In its
present form, [the anticutback rule] is specifically limited to actual amendments."
Chason, supra note 38, at 64 (alterations in original) (second and third omissions in original)
(quoting Andes v. Ford Motor Co., 70 F.3d 1332, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
149. See, e.g., Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 873 (treating relinquishment of rights as a waiver);
see also Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 741 (2004) (treating a change
to the plan as an amendment).
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of intentionally relinquishing or abandoning a known right, claim, or
privilege."' 50 By contrast, an amendment is a formal "modification,
deletion, or addition."' 5' These definitions are consistent with how the
terms are used in the case law. 5 2 By the text of ERISA section 204(g),
the anti-cutback rule applies to "an amendment of the plan." 5 3 There is
no mention of the rule applying to a waiver of benefits.154 Moreover, the
widespread use of waivers may indicate at least tacit acceptance by the
IRS that waivers do not implicate the anti-cutback rule.'55
Employers have the right to modify or amend the plan provided that
it complies with the procedure for doing so as set out in the plan
documents.'5 6 ERISA section 204(b)(3) requires a procedure set forth in
the plan that describes both the amendment procedures and identifying
who has authority to amend the plan.'5 7 A possible argument, therefore,
is that the regulation, which states that waivers by participants are
invalid, conflicts with the settlor function by prohibiting employers from
amending the plan to include a waiver. According to the settlor
function, employers retain the ability to set the terms of the plan, which
could include disclaimer provisions, such as the one in Kennedy.'58 The
IRS cannot promulgate a regulation that is inconsistent with the statute
itself,15 9 but there is room for argument that it has done so in this
instance if the waiver prohibition conflicts with the settlor function. In
150. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1406 (11th ed. 2003).
151. Id. at 39.
152. For example, when discussing the waiver, the Kennedy court noted that Liv was "a
beneficiary seeking only to relinquish her right to benefits." Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 873. The
Court has referred to the anti-cutback rule as "prohibit[ing] an amendment expanding the
categories of postretirement employment that trigger suspension of payment." Cent.
Laborers'Pension Fund, 541 U.S. at 741.
153. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054 (g)(1) (West 2010); see also id. § 1054(g)(2) ("For purposes of
paragraph (1), a plan amendment which has the effect of. . . ." (emphasis added)).
154. Id. § 1054 (2010).
155. See, e.g., Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. 865; Estate of Altobelli v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77
F.3d 78 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. 865; Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr.
Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Kennedy, 129 S.
Ct. 865; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 128 (6th Cir. 1996); McMillan v.
Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted, 922 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1990). The
IRS did not challenge the waivers as violating the anti-cutback rule in any of these cases.
156. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (extending the
settlor function articulated in Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995), to
pension plans).
157. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1102(b)(3) (West 2010). ERISA section 204(h) requires that advance
written notice be given to participants in defined benefit plans of amendments that will reduce
their future benefit accrual. Id. § 1054(h).
158. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 869.
159. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
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Clark v. Feder, Serno, & Bard, P.C., the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that a Treasury regulation promulgated under section
411(d)(6)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code was inconsistent with
ERISA's anti-cutback rule, and to the extent that was the case, the court
was "exempt[ed] . . . from any obligation to defer to it."o60 Thus, if a
court finds that this portion of Treasury regulation section 1.411(d)-4
conflicts with ERISA, the regulation will not bear weight.16 1
The IRS may counter by saying a plan amendment allowing a
waiver is invalid, arguing that the amendment itself is a cutback.
Under this interpretation, the amendment to allow a waiver would be
prohibited under the anti-cutback rule. 162  The exercise of discretion
itself can be a cutback. 16 3  Under regulation 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (4),
an employer may not, through the exercise of discretion, deny a
participant a 411(d)(6) benefit for which she is otherwise eligible
(subject to an exception for certain employee stock ownership plans).'
This portion of the regulation may be sufficient to protect the interest of
participants. Alternatively, the IRS could argue more narrowly that a
waiver is not valid if it is not specifically sanctioned by the plan. This
argument may have little chance of success if courts continue to hew to
the plan documents rule as in Matschiner v. Lewis and Boyd v.
Metropolitan Life.165
An additional argument may lie in the purpose of the anti-cutback
rule, which is to protect the participant's accrued benefits.16 6 Protection
of the accrued benefits enables the participants to rely on the vesting
rules to protect their benefits.'67  Reliance is at the core of the anti-
cutback rule. 16 8 Courts have noted this emphasis on reliance in anti-
cutback cases, including in Kennedy.16 9 Part of the reason the Court
160. Clark v. Feder, Semo & Bard, P.C., 697 F. Supp. 2d 24, 34 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994)), overruled in part by 736 F. Supp. 2d 222
(D.D.C. 2010).
161. Id.
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.41 1(d)-4, Q&A (3)(a) (as amended in 2007).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (4)(a).
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
166. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 132.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 744-45 (2004)
(noting that the plaintiff acted reasonably in relying on the plan terms in planning his
retirement and that the plan amendment "undercut any such reliance"). "[Wihen Congress
enacted ERISA, it wanted to . .. mak[e] sure that if a worker has been promised a defined
pension benefit upon retirement-and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to
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decided on the plan document rule is that following "the terms of the
plan ... establish[es] a uniform administrative scheme, [with] a set of
standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of
benefits."17 0 The Court noted that "ERISA's statutory scheme 'is built
around reliance on the face of written plan documents.'"" 7  It is unclear,
however, that the emphasis on reliance (by the plan participant in the
anti-cutback context and by both the participant and administrator in the
plan documents rule context) is sufficient to predict how the Court
would rule if faced directly with this issue of the effect of Kennedy on
the anti-cutback rule. As of the writing of this article, there have been
no federal court cases on this issue.
2. Whether Regulation Section 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (3) Applies to
Participants Only
Separate from whether the IRS has exceeded its regulatory
authority in issuing this regulation, the issue arises of whether the
regulation applies only to participants or if it applies to beneficiaries as
well.172  The IRS's rationale for prohibiting waivers appears to be the
same as the rationale underlying the anti-alienation rule-to protect
participants and beneficiaries from their own financial imprudence.173
Although the IRS argues that the waiver prohibition falls under the anti-
cutback rule,174 it may more appropriately fall under the anti-alienation
rule. The IRS may argue that the waiver prohibition is correctly within
the anti-cutback rule because it serves to protect employees from
employer coercion to disclaim benefits.'75 In that regard, it would make
obtain a vested benefit-he actually will receive it." Id. at 743 (second alteration in original)
(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Spink,
517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996); Shaw v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Pension
Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653, 656 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
plan must specify the basis on which payments are to be made to participants and
beneficiaries so as to meet the legislative purpose of having each participant know exactly
where he stands with respect to the plan." (quoting Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons,
Inc., 680 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1982)).
170. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 875 (2009)
(quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)).
171. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 875 (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514
U.S. 73, 83 (1995)).
172. See I.R.C. § 41 1(d)(6)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.41 1(d)-4, Q&A (4).
173. See MEDILL, supra note 96, at 132.
174. See Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (d)-4, Q&A (3)(a)(3).
175. See MEDILL, supra note 96, at 132; I.R.C. § 411 (d)(6)(B).
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sense for the regulation to refer only to participants. 176 This is a weak
argument, however, because of the knowing and voluntary standard
for waivers. 1
77
The waiver prohibition is in 1.411 (d)-4, Q&A (3), which addresses
the transfer of benefits between defined benefit and defined contribution
plans.17 8 Thus, it is possible that the prohibition here is limited to those
circumstances, but the prohibition provision does not indicate such a
limitation. 179 Another subsection of the same regulation, however, may
apply. According to 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (2)(e)(4), "[s]ection 411(d)(6)
protected benefits may not be eliminated merely because they are
payable with respect to a spouse or other beneficiary."s 0 So, it is
possible that this provision modifies 1.411 (d)-4, Q&A (3) such that
beneficiaries have been included throughout the regulation. 1.411(d)-4,
Q&A (2)(a)(4) addresses the issue of beneficiaries quite broadly,
questioning the extent to which "section 411 (d)(6) protected benefits
under a plan [may] be reduced or eliminated."' 8 ' Thus, this section can
be interpreted to provide a broad baseline for the entire regulation, such
that including "beneficiary" within the other subsections would be
unnecessary. Under this interpretation, the regulation would be not
consistent with Kennedy, as Kennedy allowed for a waiver of benefits.
Thus, taxpayer employers are left in a quandary as to whether waivers
will in fact be allowed by the IRS.
3. Taxpayer Options
The IRS enforces administratively via a determination letter, which
confirms with the employer that the plan document has been correctly
written.182 There are several options available under the Employee Plans
Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS) to allow an employer to
remedy plan errors that would lead to plan disqualification if
uncorrected.183 Most severe of these is the Audit Closing Agreement
176. See MEDILL, supra note 96, at 132.
177. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 986 F.2d 580, 587 (1st Cir.
1993) (discussing the knowing and voluntary standard for waivers).
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (3)(b) (as amended in 2007).
179. I.R.C. § 411 (d)(6)(D) (West 2010)
180. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (2)(a)(4) (as amended in 2007).
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (2) (as amended in 2007).
182. See KOZAK, supra note 139, at 284. A determination letter is not required but is
highly recommended. Id.; MEDILL, supra note 96, at 224.
183. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 224.
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Program (Audit CAP). 184 The Audit CAP occurs when a failure in the
plan is identified during an audit by the IRS.' 8 5  The employer must
rectify the error and pay a penalty to the IRS.186 Fear of the Audit CAP,
which is "the correction method of last resort for the employer," makes
taxpayers unlikely to buck IRS rules, which may therefore put taxpayer
employers in a difficult position if they are unclear as to whether waivers
are allowable under Kennedy and the anti-cutback rule. 87
Instead of risking an Audit CAP (and potential plan
disqualification), employers may refrain from including waiver
provisions in their plan documents.18 8 Employers will not be willing to
bet their entire pension plan against the validity of a waiver. 18 9 The risk
exists that the IRS would withhold the determination letter if it appeared
clear (to the IRS) that the waiver was authorized by the plan terms. 190
The taxpayer could challenge the denial of a determination letter, but
would face an uphill battle in doing so. 191 Alternatively, the taxpayer
could wait to get disqualified and then try to resist the adverse
consequences of disqualification, but the risks are enormous. 19 2
If a taxpayer did challenge the regulation, however, the taxpayer
would face significant challenges.193 The taxpayer would be required to
exhaust her administrative remedies before she would be able to bring
suit in federal court.19 4 The standard of review the taxpayer would then
face in federal court could be quite daunting.' 95 According to the
184. KOZAK, supra note 139, at 288. Kozak notes that the EPCRS "has been designed so
that the Audit CAP sanction will be much more punitive than the fees for [voluntary
correction with service approval]." Id.
185. Id.
186. MEDILL, supra note 96, at 225.
187. Id
188. Id at 223.
189. Id
190. See KOZAK, supra note 139, at 284-85 (discussing the process of the determination
request program).
191. See JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 49.01 (2009).
192. See MEDILL, supra note 96, at 223 (discussing the tax problems companies may
face as a result of plan disqualification); see also KOZAK, supra note 139, at 288 (describing
the punitive nature of an Audit CAP).
193. See STEIN ET AL., supra note 191, § 49.01.
194. See id. ("[P]arties may not ask a court to rule on an adverse administrative
determination until they have availed themselves of all possible remedies within the
agency itself").
195. The Treasury and the IRS have to follow the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),
which requires that agencies promulgating regulations abide by public notice and comment
procedures. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2006) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559
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landmark Chevron case,' 96 unless Congress has spoken to the precise
issue in question, courts should defer to agencies on pure questions of
statutory interpretation as long as the agency arrived at a reasonable or
permissible construction of the statute, even if the court does not believe
it is the best interpretation of the statute.'9" The rationale is that, when
selecting among various policy objectives, it is best left to agency
determination to make the appropriate policy choice.19 8
The circuit courts and the Tax Court are divided as the applicability
of Chevron.'99 According to Professor Kristin Hickman, some Circuits
apply Chevron deference to all Treasury regulations, both those
promulgated under the general authority of section 7805(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code and those promulgated under a specific
authority.2 00 Some courts treat Chevron and National Muffler (which
provides an arguably more convoluted standard than Chevron)201 as
indistinguishable and apply Chevron deference.202 Other courts, the
(2000)). The APA distinguishes "legislative" from "interpretive" rules such that public notice
and comment procedures are required only for the former. Id. Hickman notes that there are
two sources of authority behind the promulgation of Treasury regulations. Id at 1544. The
authority for many regulations is section 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, "which grants
Treasury the power to develop 'all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of' the
Code." Id. at 1544 (quoting I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2010)). Other provisions contain specific
grants of authority. Id. at 1545. Treasury regulation section 1.411 (d)-4 is one of these: at the
end of the regulation, the authority for the regulation is listed. Treas. Reg. 1.411 (d)-4 (2010).
According to section 1502 of the Internal Revenue Code, "[t]he Secretary shall prescribe such
regulations as he may deem necessary . . . in such manner as clearly to reflect the income-tax
liability and the various factors necessary for the determination of such liability, and in order
to prevent avoidance of such tax liability." I.R.C. § 1502 (West 2010). Hickman notes the
Treasury's long-standing practice of considering its general authority regulations (those
promulgated under section 7805(a)) as interpretive. Hickman, supra, at 1545. The
implication of this is that the Treasury will rarely agree that the APA's notice and comment
requirements apply, because the Treasury "regularly cites I.R.C. § 7805(a) as the legal basis
even for regulations that seemingly fall within the scope of a specific authority provision." Id.
196. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
197. Id; see also STEIN ET AL., supra note 191, § 51.01 (2009). This is typically
formulates as a two-part test: Step one is to determine "whether the statute being interpreted
clearly and unambiguously resolves the issue." See Hickman, supra note 195, at 1547. The
second step asks whether the agency's interpretation is permissible. Id. In United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Supreme Court clarified the applicability of Chevron,
leading to the result that if Chevron deference does not apply, then the more scrutinizing
Skidmore deference does. Hickman, supra note 195, at 1550-51.
198. Hickman, supra note 195, at 1548-49 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45).
199. Id. at 1556-57.
200. Id. at 1557.
201. In Nat'1 Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979), the Court
articulated a "full grab-bag of relevant factors" to be used in determining the validity of a
Treasury regulation. Hickman, supra note 195, at 1555.
202. Id. at 1557.
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Fourth Circuit and the Federal Circuit, for example, consider National
Muffler a less deferential standard; 20 3 these courts then apply Chevron
deference to regulations promulgated under specific authority and
National Muffler deference to regulations promulgated under the general
authority of section 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.m Under any
of these approaches, Treasury regulation section 1.411 (d)-4 would be
entitled to Chevron deference as it was promulgated under the specific
authority of section 1502 of the Internal Revenue Code.205 Hickman
notes that the Tax Court has been essentially all over the map in
deciding the appropriate standard for judicial review: the Tax Court has
applied Chevron, Skidmore (which pre-dated Chevron), and National
Muffler seemingly without any consistency.20 6
Although the Tax Court has not been consistent in its standard of
judicial review, considering that regulation section 1.411(d)-4 was
promulgated under specific authority, it is reasonable to assume it would
receive Chevron deference in Tax Court, and it is quite likely it would
receive that level of deference on appeal to the appropriate Circuit Court.
C. Recommendation: Provide Guidance on the Applicability of
Regulation 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (3)
In light of the potential confusion and uncertainty surrounding
1.411(d)-4, Q&A (3) in the wake of Kennedy, this Article recommends
that the IRS provide guidance as to the scope and applicability of that
section of the regulation. The regulation specifies that "a participant
may not elect to waive section 411 (d)(6) protected benefits."20 7 This
portion of the regulation does not appear to apply to beneficiaries. So,
according to the regulation, although it would not be permissible for a
participant to waive her benefits, a beneficiary doing so would not run
afoul of the anti-cutback rule. This seems an odd outcome. According
to ERISA, a participant is "any employee or former employee . .. who is
or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an
employee benefit plan ... or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to
receive any such benefit." 20 8 A beneficiary is "a person designated by a
participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Hickman, supra note 195, at 1555.
206. Id. at 1558-59.
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (3) (2010) (as amended in 2007) (emphasis added).
208. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(7) (West 2010).
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become entitled to a benefit thereunder." 209 The goal of the anti-cutback
rule, as previously discussed, is to protect the accrued benefits from a
retroactive repeal or reduction in benefits via a plan amendment.210
Beneficiaries, just as participants, would be served by this, thus is seems
inconsistent that the regulation applies to one group but not the other.
This may be seen as a possible source of consistency with Kennedy,
however: Liv, the beneficiary, waived her benefits. 2 1 1 According to the
literal terms of Treasury regulation section 1.411 (d)-4, because Liv is the
beneficiary and not the participant, the regulation is not violated. In
light of 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (2)(e)(4), however, a reasonable reading of
1.41 1(d)-4, Q&A (3) may be that 1.41 l(d)-4, Q&A (2)(e)(4) has already
incorporated beneficiaries. This reading would render 1.411 (d)-4, Q&A
(3) inconsistent with Kennedy as well as the policies underlying the anti-
cutback rule.
Alternatively, the Treasury could provide guidance as to why this
provision falls under the anti-cutback regulations, rather than the anti-
alienation regulations.
CONCLUSION
Kennedy raises additional unanswered questions that are beyond the
scope of this Article. As an immediate practical concern following
Kennedy, former spouses ought to change their beneficiary designations
in their pension plans unless they intend for their former spouses to
remain the beneficiary.2 12 In that regard, Kennedy reiterates the point
made in Egelhoff that the terms of the plan document will control.
Additionally, as discussed earlier, there is the issue of federal courts
distinguishing Kennedy from situations where the plan documents do not
specify a means for a beneficiary to disclaim her interests. In addition,
after Kennedy, the question arises of whether a beneficiary (or
participant) could sell her waiver. That situation is difficult to
distinguish from Kennedy as that is arguably what Liv did. It was not a
gratuitous disclaimer; it was made as part of a divorce settlement in
which Liv received consideration in return. Another issue posed by
209. Id. § 1002(8).
210. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
211. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 869 (2009).
212. See, e.g., Finkel & Bloom, supra note 86, at 464; see also Mike Beaver, Supreme
Court Says Plan Documents Resolve ERISA Beneficiary Disputes, COLO. EMP. L. LETTER,
Apr. 2009, at 1 (2009) ("[T]he Supreme Court's decision places virtually all the responsibility
for correct beneficiary designation on employees.").
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Kennedy is why the absence of a provision of how to disclaim benefits
would not lead simply to deference under Firestone.2 13 Under Firestone,
claims for benefits receive de novo review unless the plan gives the
administrator the discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.2 14 In Kennedy, there was a
procedure to disclaim benefits. Accordingly, under Firestone, the plan
administrator's decision should have been reviewed under an arbitrary
and capricious standard, meaning the court will not disturb the
determination if it is reasonable.2 15 But the Court in Kennedy did not
address Firestone. These are among the questions that remain open
after Kennedy.
The Kennedy decision did, however, resolve issues that had divided
the courts of appeals. As both pension plans and divorces (and other
domestic relations orders) are widespread, this decision can have a
widespread impact.2 16 The decision, which has been said to "favor[]
plan convenience and simplicity at the expense of equity," 217 is a bright-
line rule providing ease of administration as well as understanding to
both participants and plan administrators. Kennedy obviously implicated
the anti-alienation rule, but the anti-cutback rule is implicated as well.
As a result of the Kennedy decision, which allows waivers without
violating the anti-alienation rule, this Article recommends that the IRS
provide more specific guidance as to the applicability of Treasury
regulation section 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (3) prohibition on waivers and
explain any impact of Kennedy on the regulation.
213. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989).
214. See id. at 115.
215. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115.
216. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 431 (5th
Cir. 2007), af'd, 129 S. Ct. 865, 873 (2009).
217. Meredith Z. Maresca, Attorneys Discuss Effect Kennedy Decision Might Have on
Drafting Plan Documents PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY Mar. 5, 2009, at 1.
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